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THE INTERl'IET WORM 
Password Cracking: 
A Game of Wits 
The foLLowing report has been gleaned from 1\ Tour of the Worm," 
an in-depth account of the November Intemet infection. The author 
found the worms crypt algorithm a frustrating, yet engaging, puzzle. 
Donn Seeley 
A password cracking algorithm seems like a slow and 
bulky item to put in a worm, but the worm makes this 
work by being persistent and efficient. The worm is 
aided by some unfortunate statistics about typical pass-
word choices. 
For example, if the login name is "abc," then "abc," 
"cba," and "abcabc" are excellent candidates for pass-
words. 
[F.T. Grammp and R. Morris] 
The worm's password guessing is driven by a 4-state 
machine. The first state gathers password data, while 
the remaining states represent increasingly less likely 
sources of potential passwords. The central cracking 
routine is called cracksome( ), and it contains a switch 
on each of the four states. 
The routine that implements the first state we named 
crack_Or ). This routine's job is to collect information 
about hosts and accounts. It is only run once; the infor-
mation it gathers persists for the lifetime of the worm. 
Its implementation is straightforward: it reads the files 
/etc/hosts.equiv and j.rhosts for hosts to attack, then 
reads the password file looking for accounts. For each 
account, the worm saves the name, the encrypted pass-
word, the home directory and the user information 
fields. As a quick preliminary check, it looks for a 
.forward mail forwarding file in each user's home direc-
tory and saves any host name it finds in that file. 
We unimaginatively called the function for the next 
state crack_1( ) .. crack_1( ) looks for trivially broken 
passwords. These are passwords which can be guessed 
merely on the basis of information already contained in 
the password file. Grampp and Morris [2] report a sur-
vey of over 100 password files that found that between 
8 and 30 percent of all passwords could be guessed 
using just the literal account name and a couple of 
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variations. The worm tries a little harder than this: it 
checks the null password, the account name, the ac-
count name concatenated with itself, the first name 
(extracted from the user information field, with the first 
letter mapped to lower case), the last name, and the 
account name reversed. It runs through up to 50 ac-
counts per call to cracksome( ), saving its place in the 
list of accounts and advancing to the next state when it 
runs out of accounts to try. 
The next state is handled by crack_2( ). In this state 
the worm compares a list of favorite passwords, one 
password per call, with all of the encrypted passwords 
in the password file. The list contains 432 words, most 
of which are real English words or proper names; it 
seems likely that this list was generated by stealing 
password files and cracking them at leisure on the 
worm author's home machine. A global variable nextw 
is used to count the number of passwords tried, and it 
is this count (plus a loss in the population control game) 
that controls whether the worm exits at the end of the 
main loop-nextw must be greater than 10 before the 
worm can exit. Since the worm normally spends 
2.5 minutes checking for clients over the course of the 
main loop and calls cracksome( ) twice in that period, 
it appears that the worm must make a minimum of 
7 passes through the main loop, taking more than 
15 minutes.' It will take at least nine hours for the 
, For those mindful of details: the first call to cracksome( ) is consumed 
reading system files. The worm must spend at least one call to cracksome( ) 
in the second state attacking trivial passwords. This accounts for at least one 
pass through the main loop. In the third state, r:racksomc{ ) tests one pass-
word from its list of favorites on each calL the worm will exit if it lost a roll of 
the dice and more than 10 words have been checked. so this accounts for at 
least six loops, two words on each loop for five loops to reach 10 words. then 
another loop to pass that number. Altogether this amounts to a minimum of 7 
loops. If all 7 loops took the maximum amount of time waiting for clients. this 
would require a minimum of 17.5 minutes, but the two-minute check can exit 
early if a client connects and the server loses the challenge. hence 15.5 
minutes of waiting time plus runtime overhead is the minimum lifetime. In 
this period, a worm will attack at least 8 hosts through the host infection 
routines, and \vill try abuut 18 passwords for each accuunt, attacking more 
hosts if accounts are cracked. 
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worm to scan its built-in password list and proceed to 
the next state. 
The last state is handled by crack_3( ). It opens the 
UNIX@ online dictionary / usr/ diet / words and goes 
through it one word at a time. If a word is capitalized, 
the worm tries a lower-case version as well. This 
search can essentially go on forever: it would take 
something like four weeks for the worm to finish a 
typical dictionary like ours. 
When the worm selects a potential password, it 
passes it to a routine we called try _password( ). This 
function calls the worm's special version of the UNIX 
password encryption function crypt( ) and compares 
the result with the target account's actual encrypted 
password. If they are equal, or if the password and 
guess are the null string (no password), the worm saves 
the cleartext password and proceeds to attack the hosts 
that are connected to this account. A routine'we called 
try _forward_and_rhosts( ) reads the user 's .forward 
and .rhosts files, calling the previously described hU1( 
function for each remote account it finds. 
FASTER PASSWORD ENCRYPTION 
The use of encrypted passwords appears reasonably 
secure in the absence of serious attention of experts in 
the fie/d. 
[R. Morris and K. Thompson] 
Unfortunately, some experts in the field have been giv-
ing serious attention to fast implementations of the 
UNIX password encryption algorithm. UNIX password 
authentication works without putting any readable ver-
sion of the password onto the system, and indeed works 
without protecting the encrypted password against 
reading by users on the system. When a user types a 
password in the clear, the system encrypts it using the 
standard crypt( ) library routine, then compares it 
against a saved copy of the encrypted password. The 
encryption algorithm is meant to be basically impossi-
ble to invert, preventing the retrieval of passwords by 
examining only the encrypted text, and it is meant to 
be expensive to run, so that testing guesses will take a 
long time. The UNIX password encryption algorithm is 
based on the Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES). 
Currently no one knows how to invert this algorithm in 
a reasonable amount of time, and while fast DES encod-
ing chips are available, the UNIX version of the algo-
rithm is slightly perturbed so that it is impossible to use 
a standard DES chip to implement it. 
Two problems have been mitigating against the UNIX 
implementation of DES. Computers are continually in-
creasing in speed-current machines are typically sev-
eral times faster than the machines that were available 
when the current password scheme was invented. At 
the same time, methods have been discovered to make 
software DES run faster. UNIX passwords are now far 
more susceptible to persistent guessing, particularly 
if the encrypted passwords are already known. The 
UNIX is a registered trademark of AT&T Bell Laboratories. 
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worm's version of the UNIX crypt( ) routine ran more 
than nine times faster than the standard version when 
we tested it on our VAX 8600. While the standard 
crypt( ) takes 54 seconds to encrypt 271 passwords on 
our 8600 (the number of passwords actually contained 
in our password file) , the worm's crypt( ) takes less 
than six seconds. 
The worm's crypt( ) algorithm appears to be a com-
promise between time and space: the time needed to 
encrypt one password guess versus the substantial extra 
table space needed to squeeze performance out of the 
algorithm. Curiously, one performance improvement 
actually saves a little space. The traditional UNIX algo-
rithm stores each bit of the password in a byte, while 
the worm's algorithm packs the bits into two 32-bit 
words. This permits the worm's algorithm to use bit-
field and shift operations on the password data, which 
are immensely faster. Other speedups include unrolling 
loops, combining tables, precomputing shifts and 
masks, and eliminating redundant initial and final per-
mutations when performing the 25 applications of mod-
ified DES that the password encryption algorithm uses. 
The biggest performance improvement comes as a re-
sult of combining permutations: the worm uses ex-
panded arrays which are indexed by groups of bits 
rather than the single bits used by the standard algo-
rithm. Matt Bishop's fast version of crypt( ) [1] does all 
of these things and also precomputes even more func-
tions, yielding twice the performance of the worm's 
algorithm but requiring nearly 200 KB of initialized 
data as opposed to the 6 KB used by the worm and the 
less than 2 KB used by the normal crypt( ). 
How can system administrators defend against fast 
implementations of crypt( )? One suggestion that has 
been introduced for foiling the bad guys is the idea of 
shadow password files. In this scheme, the encrypted 
passwords are hidden rather than public, forcing a 
cracker to either break a privileged account or use the 
host's CPU and (slow) encryption algorithm to attack , 
with the added danger that password test requests 
could be logged and password cracking discovered. The 
disadvantage of shadow password files is that if the 
bad guys somehow get around the protections for the 
file that contains the actual passwords, all of the pass-
words must be considered cracked and will need to be 
replaced. 
Another suggestion has been to replace the UNIX 
DES implementation with the fastest available imple-
mentation, but run it 1000 times or more instead of the 
25 times used in the UNIX crypt( ) code. Unless the 
repeat count is somehow pegged to the fastest available 
CPU speed, this approach merely postpones the day of 
reckoning until the cracker finds a faster machine. It's 
interesting to note that Morris and Thompson measured 
the time to compute the old M-209 (non-DES) password 
encryption algorithm used in early versions of UNIX on 
the PDP-ll / 70 and found that a good implementation 
took only 1.25 milliseconds per encryption, which they 
VA X is a trademark of Digi tal Equ ipment Corporation. 
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deemed insufficient; currently the VAX 8600 using 
Matt Bishop's DES-based algorithm needs 11.5 milli-
seconds per encryption, and machines 10 times faster 
than the VAX 8600 at a cheaper price will be available 
soon (if they aren't already!). 
OPINIONS 
The act of breaking into a computer system has to have 
the same social stigma as breaking into a neighbor's 
house. It should not matter that the neighbor's door is 
unlocked. 
[K. Thompson] 
[Creators of viruses are 1 stealing a car for the purpose of 
joyriding. [R. Morris, in 1983 Capitol Hill testimony, 
cited in the New York Times, 11/11/88] 
I do not propose to offer definitive statements on the 
morality of the worm's author, the ethics of publishing 
security information or the security needs of the UNIX 
computing community, since people better (and less) 
qualified than I are still copiously flaming on these top-
ics in the various network newsgroups and mailing 
lists. For the sake of the mythical ordinary system ad-
ministrator who might have been confused by all the 
information and misinformation, I will try to answer a 
few of the most relevant questions in a narrow but 
useful way. 
Did the worm cause damage? The worm did not de-
stroy files, intercept private mail, reveal passwords, cor-
rupt databases or plant trojan horses. It did compete for 
CPU with, and eventually overwhelm, ordinary user 
processes. It used up limited system resources such as 
the open file table and the process text table, causing 
user processes to fail for lack of same. It caused some 
machines to crash by operating them close to the limits 
of their capacity, exercising bugs that do not appear 
under normal loads. It forced administrators to perform 
one or more reboots to clear worms from the system, 
terminating user sessions and long-running jobs. It 
forced administrators to shut down network gateways, 
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including gateways between important nation-wide re-
search networks in an effort to isolate the worm. This 
action led to delays of up to several days in the ex-
change of electronic mail, causing some projects to miss 
deadlines and others to lose valuable research time. 
It made systems staff across the country drop their 
ongoing hacks and work 24-hour days trying to corner 
and kill worms. It caused members of management in 
at least one institution to become so frightened that 
they scrubbed all the disks at their facility that were 
online at the time of the infection, and limited reload-
ing of files to data that was verifiably unmodified by a 
foreign agent. It caused bandwidth through gateways 
that were still running after the infection started to 
become substantially degraded-the gateways were us-
ing much of their capacity just shipping the worm from 
one network to another. It penetrated user accounts 
and caused it to appear that a given user was disturbing 
a system when in fact they were not responsible. It's 
true that the worm could have been far more harmful 
than it actually turned out to be: in the last few weeks, 
several security bugs have come to light which the 
worm could have used to thoroughly destroy a system. 
Perhaps we should be grateful that we escaped incredi-
bly awful consequences, and perhaps we should also be 
grateful that we have learned so much about the weak-
nesses in our system's defenses, but I think we should 
share our gratefulness with someone other than the 
worm's author. 
Was the worm malicious? Some people have suggested 
that the worm was an innocent experiment that got out 
of hand, and that it was never intended to spread so 
fast or so widely. We can find evidence in the worm to 
support and to contradict this hypothesis. There are a 
number of bugs in the worm that appear to be the 
result of hasty or careless programming. For example, 
in the worm's iLinit( ) routine, there is a call to the 
block zero function bzero( ) that incorrectly uses the 
block itself rather than the block's address as an argu-
ment. It's also possible that a bug was responsible for 
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the ineffectiveness of the population control measures 
used by the worm. This could be seen as evidence that 
a development version of the worm "got loose" acciden-
tally, and perhaps the author originally intended to test 
the final version under controlled conditions, in an 
environment from which it would not escape. 
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence 
that the worm was designed to reproduce quickly and 
spread itself over great distances. It can be argued that 
the population control hacks in the worm are anemic 
by design: they are a compromise between spreading 
the worm as quickly as possible and raising the load 
enough to be detected and defeated. A worm will exist 
for a substantial amount of time and will perform a 
substantial amount of work even if it loses the roll of 
the (imaginary) dice; moreover, one-in-seven worms be-
come immortal and cannot be killed by dice rolls. 
There is ample evidence that the worm was designed 
to hamper efforts to stop it even after it was identified 
and captured. It certainly succeeded in this, since it 
took almost a day before the last mode of infection (the 
finger server) was identified, analyzed and reported 
widely; the worm was very successful in propagating 
itself during this time even on systems which had fixed 
the send mail debug problem and had turned off rexec. 
Finally, there is evidence that the worm's author delib-
erately introduced the worm to a foreign site that was 
left open and welcome to casual outside users, rather 
ungraciously abusing this hospitality. He apparently 
further abused this trust by deleting a log file that 
might have revealed information that could link his 
home site with the infection. I think the innocence 
lies in the research community rather than with the 
worm's author. 
Will publication of worm details further harm security? 
In a sense, the worm itself has solved that problem: it 
has published itself by sending copies to hundreds or 
thousands of machines around the world. Of course, a 
bad guy who wants to use the worm's tricks would 
have to go through the same effort that we went 
through in order to understand the program, but then it 
only took us a week to completely decompile the pro-
gram. Therefore, while it takes fortitude to hack the 
worm, it clearly is not greatly difficult for a decent 
programmer. One of the worm's most effective tricks 
was advertised when it entered-the bulk of the send-
mail hack is visible in the log file, and a few minutes 
work with the sources will reveal the rest of the trick. 
The worm's fast password algorithm could be useful to 
the bad guys, but at least two other faster implementa-
tions have been available for a year or more, so it is not 
very secret, or even very original. Finally, the details of 
the worm have been well enough sketched out on var-
ious newsgroups and mailing lists that the principal 
hacks are common knowledge. I think it is more impor-
tant that we understand what happened, so that we can 
make it less likely to happen again, rather than spend 
time in a futile effort to cover up the issue from every-
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one but the bad guys. Fixes for both source and binary 
distributions are widely available, and anyone who 
runs a system with these vulnerabilities needs to look 
into these fixes immediately, if they have not done so 
already. 
CONCLUSION 
It has raised the public awareness to a considerable 
degree. 
[R. Morris, New York Times, 11/5/88] 
This quote is one of the understatements of the year. 
The worm story was on the front page of the New York 
Times and other newspapers for days. It was the subject 
of television and radio features. Even the Bloom County 
comic strip poked fun at it. 
Our community has never before been in the lime-
light in this way, and judging by the response, it has 
scared us. I will not offer any fancy platitudes about 
how the experience is going to change us, but I will say 
that I think these issues have been ignored for much 
longer than was safe, and I feel that a better under-
standing of the crisis just past will help us cope better 
with the next one. Let's hope we are as lucky the next 
time. 
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